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 1 
Difference, Cognition, and Causality: Maurice Scève’s Délie  
and Charles de Bovelles’s Ars Oppositorum 
 
Both Maurice Scève’s Délie (1544) and Charles de Bovelles’s Ars 
Oppositorum (1511), explore various kinds of difference, as well as the  
relationship between difference, identity and similarity. The Ars 
Oppositorum is a work of prose philosophy in Latin which offers a very 
unusual version of the Aristotelian square of opposites: it is a discussion of 
how opposites can be used to produce knowledge.
1
 By contrast, the Délie is 
a collection of love lyric influenced by Petrarchism. Despite these 
differences of genre, as I have shown elsewhere, the Délie and the Ars share 
an interest in the function of various kinds of difference both within and 
between pairs of opposite terms;
 
in particular, both texts undermine 
antithetical difference by confusing it with other kinds of difference, thus 
                                                 
1
 On the Ars Oppositorum, see Maurice de Gandillac, ‘L’Art bovilien des opposés’, in Charles de Bovelles 
en son cinquième centenaire 1479-1979: Actes du colloque international tenu à Noyon les 14-15-16 
septembre 1979, ed. by Jean-Claude Margolin (Paris: Guy Trédaniel, Éditions de la Maisnie, 1982), pp. 
157-70; Joseph M. Victor, Charles de Bovelles 1479-1553: An Intellectual Biography (Geneva: Droz, 
1978), pp. 73-87; and Jean-Claude Margolin, ‘Sur L’Art des opposés de Bovelles’, in Logique et Littérature 
à la Renaissance: Actes du Colloque de la Baume-les-Aix, Université de Provence, 16-18 septembre 1991, 
eds Marie-Luce Demonay-Launay and André Tournon (Paris: Champion, 1994), pp. 5-16. 
 2 
challenging the categorisation of differences which was so central to 
Aristotelian logic.
2
 Furthermore, I will argue in this essay that both texts are 
also interested in the relation of ‘opposition’ (or difference) to causality and 
to cognition, to the natural and to the human. Both writers explore the role of 
the human subject in establishing difference, and suggest that human 
cognition may be very powerful, so that it even seems to usurp the function 
of natural causality. However, ultimately Scève and Bovelles diverge in their 
assessment of the value of difference, both in general and for the human 
subject in particular. I shall focus in this essay upon Scève’s ‘jealous sun’ 
dizains in which, I have argued elsewhere, the beloved lady alters relations 
of difference within the cosmos.
3
 
My aim in reading a poetic text alongside a theoretical one is not to 
construct a univocal account of Renaissance conceptions of difference, or to 
                                                 
2
 See my article ‘Opposites and Identities: Maurice Scève’s Délie and Charles de Bovelles’s Ars 
Oppositorum’. On antiperistasis in Scève and Bovelles, see Stephen Murphy, ‘Bovelles. Scève. Bruno. 
Antiperistasis’, Allegorica 14 (1993), pp. 39-52. Other discussions of Scève in the context of Bovelles’s 
thought are Jacqueline Risset, L’Anagramme du désir: Sur la Délie de Maurice Scève (Paris, Fourbis, 
1995), pp. 91-100; Doranne Fenoaltea, “Si haulte Architecture”: The Design of Scève’s Délie (Kentucky: 
French Forum, 1982), pp. 84-92. 
3
 ‘Opposites and Identities’. 
 3 
consider philosophy as a source for poetry;
4
 instead, I will locate not only 
the similarities but also the divergences between the Délie and the Ars. 
Indeed the generic differences between the two texts mean that they may 
have provided contrasting conceptual possibilities: thus they illuminate 
different possible ways of thinking about opposition and sameness in early 
sixteenth-century France. Some differences arise from the simple fact that, 
while love lyric explores particular terms which it often places in opposition 
to one another, the Ars Oppositorum sets out to analyse the principle of 
opposition. More specifically for the concerns of this essay, Bovelles, in 
common with much sixteenth-century prose philosophy, tends to refer to 
‘man’ Ŕ or the human intellectus (understanding / perception) Ŕ in the 
abstract singular; by contrast, love lyric depicts both the subjective 
experience of a ie and also the desired tu or elle; as I will discuss, this 
divergence between the Ars and the Délie is central to their contrasting 
perceptions of difference in the human subject. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Cf Hans Staub’s reading of the Délie in the context of the thought of Nicholas of Cusa, an important 
influence upon Bovelles: Le Curieux Désir: Scève et Peletier du Mans, poètes de la connaissance (Geneva: 
Droz, 1967). 
 4 
i) Cognition and Causality: The Intellectus And Nature In The Ars 
Oppositorum 
 
Both Scève and Bovelles are deeply interested in the role of the human in 
relation to opposition. Two key questions emerge in relation to this. Firstly, 
what role does human perception or understanding play in opposition? That 
is, what effects does the human gaze or the human mind exert upon 
opposition? And, secondly, how are human subjects affected by opposition? 
In other words, are human beings subject to opposition?  
 Bovelles states in his first chapter that oppositions can stem either 
from nature or reason: his first subheading states (using a spatial image 
typical of Bovelles’s writing) that ‘we call opposites things placed facing 
each other, turned towards one another, separated by the distance of either a 
natural or a rational line’.5 Opposites include, for Bovelles, all things 
placed in relation to one another ‘either by nature or by 
understanding/perception (the intellectus)’ (p. 36). Oppositions of substance 
(substantia) and / or the thing (res) stem from nature, whereas oppositions of 
                                                 
5
 ‘Opposita dicuntur contra se posita, in alterutrum conversa, interstite aut naturali aut rationali dyametro 
distantia’: ed. by Pierre Magnard, (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1984), p. 36. I refer throughout to 
Magnard’s edition; translations into English are my own, although I have consulted Magnard’s French 
translation. All italics are my own. 
 5 
reasoning (ratio) stem from the intellectus.
6
 Bovelles’s first chapter 
emphasises at some length that the intellectus cannot alter the nature or 
substance of things Ŕ it cannot divide them or put them together; the 
intellectus cannot ‘create’ or ‘engender’ anything. Instead the human 
intellectus adds rationes (‘reasonings’) to things, producing conceptions 
which stem from the mind rather than simply from nature.
7
 Therefore, the 
process of human reasoning embedded in Bovelles’s square of opposites Ŕ 
while described as creative
8
 Ŕ seems to be one of cognition rather than 
genuine creation.  
                                                 
6
 Bovelles also discusses the intellectus in the Liber de Intellectu and the De Sapiente in particular (both 
published together with the Ars in 1511). I restrict myself here to the Ars Oppositorum, where the 
intellectus is discussed in its relation to opposition.  
7
 ‘For the intellectus cannot change the nature or substance of things, nor can it divide them or put them 
together … the intellectus creates nothing and engenders nothing … The intellectus has, however, although 
sterile and infertile as far as substance is concerned, some force and fertility of its own, by which it can be 
called creator of rationes (reasonings); it adds, you see, to the things themselves its own rationes, which it 
derives, contains and grasps. The conception which is in the human intellectus is the fruit and offspring of 
the human intellectus and the mind’s own work, not the work of nature alone’: ‘Nam intellectus rerum 
naturam et substantiam immutare non potest, neque enim illas dividit aut componit … intellectus … nil 
creat gignitque nichil … Habet tamen intellectus licet substantia sterilis atque infecundus propriam aliquam 
vim et fecunditatem, qua rationum opifex dicitur; proprias quippe rebus ipsis addit rationes, illas haurit, 
continet et complectitur. Is enim conceptus qui humano inest intellectui fecunditas est et partus humani 
intellectus ac peculiare mentis opus, non opus simplicis nature’ (pp. 44-6). 
8
 It produces ‘a productive development of discourse’: ‘fecunda quedam orationis propagatio’ (p. 32). 
 6 
However, later in the Ars (especially in chapters 4 and 7), Bovelles 
suggests that opposites are not natural. Although Bovelles stated in the first 
chapter that opposites can be ‘rational’ or natural, in the fourth chapter he 
says that in nature all things are in relations of identity to themselves rather 
than relations of opposition to other things; indeed the fourth chapter is 
entitled ‘That all things have been made by nature in identity, and none in 
opposition’.9 Furthermore, Bovelles tends to write as if the production of 
oppositions might even affect nature. Whereas things in nature are ‘in their 
own place’ and never move from it, relations of opposition force things into 
places which are not their own (like earth into the place of fire and vice 
versa), and put different things into the same place (pp. 58-60).  
Chapter 7 aligns opposition with the intellectus by contradistinction to 
nature: all oppositions result from the intellectus rather than from nature, and 
‘the intellect is the opposition of the entirety of nature’.10 The intellectus is 
presented as a domain in which all things are opposed, by contrast with the 
                                                 
9
 ‘Quod omnia a natura in identitate sint facta, in oppositione nulla’ (p. 58). 
10
 ‘Si a natura nulla est oppositio, superest ut omnis oppositio sit ab intellectu’ (heading of first subsection, 
p. 80); ‘intellectus est totius nature oppositio, natura vero omnium identitas’ (heading of second subsection, 
p. 80). 
 7 
domain of nature in which all things are separated and identical.
11
 The 
intellectus is a ‘judge’ (iudex) of all things and of their oppositions and 
differences. Moreover, the domains of the intellectus and nature are not 
entirely independent. The judging by the intellectus is necessary to nature.
12
 
The intellectus is represented as a sun (p. 88) or a light which illuminates 
nature (p. 84);
13
 without this ‘light’, nature would be in a state of ‘chaos’, 
‘confusion’ and ‘mixity’ (p. 84).14 The introduction by the intellectus of 
opposition thus seems to affect nature.  
                                                 
11
 See in particular the subsection heading ‘Omnia in mundo sunt separate et eadem, coniuncta vero sunt, et 
opposite in intellectu’ (p. 82) 
12
 See also Bovelles’s De Sapiente, as well as Pierre Magnard’s ‘L’Idéal du sage dans le De Sapiente de 
Charles de Bovelles’, in Charles de Bovelles en son cinquième centenaire 1479-1979: Actes du colloque 
international tenu à Noyon les 14-15-16 septembre 1979, ed. by Jean-Claude Margolin (Paris: Guy 
Trédaniel, Éditions de la Maisnie, 1982), pp. 101-8. 
13
 On solar imagery in Bovelles’s De Sapiente, see Cesare Vasoli, ‘Thèmes solaires du De Sapiente’, in 
Charles de Bovelles en son cinquième centenaire 1479-1979: Actes du colloque international tenu à Noyon 
les 14-15-16 septembre 1979, ed. by Jean-Claude Margolin (Paris: Guy Trédaniel, Éditions de la Maisnie, 
1982), pp. 109-28. 
14
 Bovelles does not explain clearly how this depiction of nature as confusion fits with his representation of 
opposition as a mixing of things which is be contrasted with the separation or non-mixing of things in 
nature: see in particular, pp. 80-1. Bovelles’s spatial metaphors are often deeply complex. The notion of a 
light dividing Chaos recalls God but Bovelles has earlier made it clear that he does not mean the divine 
intellectus, which in any case ‘is nature itself’ (p. 45).  
 8 
Furthermore, although Bovelles repeatedly says that opposition is 
impossible in nature and exists only in the intellectus, the intellectus’s 
opposition of things is repeatedly presented as if it had a strong and violent 
effect upon nature. Both chapters 4 and 7 emphasise that opposition is a 
violence Ŕ or a force (vis) Ŕ inflicted upon things, and that it acts against 
nature (pp. 58-60, 80-2). The terms violentum / violenta and contra naturam 
/ nature contraria are repeated. Nature does not permit opposition, and does 
not permit earth and fire to swap places, and yet in some sense the intellectus 
does bring things into places other than their natural ones, as if it could 
reorder space and the cosmic hierarchy: ‘with just as much rest and peace as 
fire remains high, with this much immobility and peace earth is at rest 
immobile below. And with as much quarrel and difficulty fire is maintained 
below, as with force and discord the earth is at rest above. Identity, 
therefore, and the peace of both elements, is that fire be high and earth be 
low. On the other hand, the quarrel and discord of both is that fire be placed 
and positioned below and earth above.’15  
                                                 
15
 ‘quanta quiete et pace ignis sursum immobilis perseverat, tanta immobilitate et pace terra deorsum 
quiescit immobilis. Et quanta lite atque difficultate ignis continetur in immo, tanta vi et discordia terra 
quiescit in summo. Identitas igitur est et utriusque pax elementi: ignem esse in summon et terram in immo. 
Utriusque vero lis et discordia ignem in immo et terram in summo sisti et collocari’ (p. 58). 
 9 
There is a strong sense of the power exerted by the human intellectus 
upon the world: Bovelles tends to write as if cognition really could affect 
nature, as if cognition could almost be causality. Perhaps one might even 
read his emphasis that the intellectus ‘creates nothing and engenders 
nothing’ as betraying doubts concerning the absolute separation of cognition 
and causality.
16
 There is a rather uncertain relation between cognition and 
change, between the intellectus and nature; there is a sense that cognition 
and creativity might overlap in function.  
 
 
ii) Cognition And Causality: The Lady’s Gaze And The Je In The Délie 
 
Bovelles presents human understanding or perception (the intellectus) as a 
light which violently introduces difference into the world, which puts things 
into unnatural places and different things into the same place, and which 
reverses the cosmic hierarchy. This provides some startling comparisons and 
contrasts with Scève’s ‘jealous sun’ dizains. I have argued in a previous 
article that Scève represents his lady as a bright light who, through her 
                                                 
16
 In the second ‘circle’ of Le Fèvre de La Boderie’s Encyclie, the teacher-Muse corrects the secrétaire’s 
mistake in confusing cognition and natural change, and lists the differences between them.  
 10 
brightness, first, introduces difference into the sun, making it different from 
itself, and, secondly, alters the relations of difference between the day and 
night, so that both seem to co-exist in the same place, or to occupy the place 
of the other.
17
 Importantly for my comparison with Bovelles’s intellectus-
light, it is the lady’s status as light which brings about this introduction and 
modification of difference, and which thus alters nature. Indeed, although 
the ‘jealous sun’ topos and related images are common in Petrarch’s poetry 
and in sixteenth-century French love lyric, the Délie places a particular 
emphasis upon light in this context, whereas, for example, Du Bellay Ŕ in his 
Olive, published five years after the Délie Ŕ evokes the heat of the sun and 
its benefits for nature.
18
  
Furthermore, the light of the lady can also be thought of as a site of 
perception or cognition. It may be her eyes which are suns: they are ‘deux 
Soleils’ (D269).19 Indeed there is a strong sense of similarity between the 
eye and the sun both within the Délie and in other contemporary texts. It was 
                                                 
17
 ‘Opposites and Identities’.  
18
 ‘J’ay veu, Amour, (et tes beaulx traictz dorez / M’en soient tesmoings,) suyvant ma souvereine, / Naistre 
les fleurs de l’infertile arene / Apres ses pas dignes d’estre adorez: / Phebus honteux ses cheveulx honorez / 
Cacher, alors que les vents par la plaine / Eparpilloient de leur souëfve halaine / Ceulx là qui sont de fin or 
colorez’: L’Olive, ed. E. Caldarini (Geneva: Droz, 1974); first published in 1549, s. XVII. 
19
 Throughout this essay I cite Gérard Defaux’s edition of the Délie (Geneva: Droz, 2004). 
 11 
commonplace to refer to the sun as an eye, and also to the eye as a light; thus 
Scève refers to the sun as the ‘Œil du monde’ (D303) and to the eye as a 
‘lumiere’ (D7, D13). The eye was widely believed to cast light during the 
process of vision.
20
 In Leone Ebreo’s Dialoghi d’amore, the ‘grand bréviaire 
du platonisme lyonnais’ and an important intertext for the Délie,21 Philon 
explains at length that both the eye and the sun both illuminate and see (as 
do the human intellect and the divine intellect): 
 
Comme l’entendement humain est comparé à l’intellect divin, pource que l’un et l’autre 
void et illumine, et comme l’œil est comparé au Soleil, à voir et illuminer egalement, et 
aussi comme l’œil se compare à l’entendement humain en deux choses (asavoir, illuminer 
et voir): aussi le Soleil, pource qu’il void et illumine les choses, ressemble le divin 
intellect.
22
  
 
                                                 
20
 See David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1976). 
21
 Verdun-L. Saulnier, Maurice Scève (ca. 1500-1560) (Geneva / Paris: Slatkine, 1981), first published in 
1948-9, vol. I, pp. 209, 249; T. Anthony Perry, Erotic Spirituality: The Integrative Tradition from Leone 
Ebreo to John Donne (University, Ala.: The University of Alabama Press, 1980), pp. 35-52; Kathryn 
Banks, ‘The Cosmic, the Human, and the Divine: The Role of Poetic Images in Guillaume de Saluste Du 
Bartas’s Sepmaine and Maurice Scève’s Délie’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 
2005), pp. 108-68. 
22
 Dialogues d’Amour, ed. by T. Anthony Perry, transl. by Pontus de Tyard (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1974); translation first published in 1551, p. 168. 
 12 
Similarly, for the French philosophical poet Isaac Habert, the process of 
light being cast by the eye was sufficiently similar to that of light being cast 
by the sun to allow examples from one process to account for something 
about the other: to explain why one sometimes perceives three suns or 
moons, Habert says that the sun is reflected in a wet cloud because its rays 
are sent back to it just as are the rays from our eyes when we look at a river 
or mirror.
23
 Bovelles himself develops a lengthy analogy between the 
celestial bodies and the human faculties, in which the sun Ŕ an ‘eye’ Ŕ 
corresponds to man or to human reason.
24
 Thus one could argue that in the 
Délie the powerful lady Ŕ who introduces difference to the world Ŕ is not 
only a light but also a gaze; thus Scève’s description of his lady-light recalls 
Bovelles’s description of the perception of the intellectus more generally.  
 However, whereas Bovelles refers to the human intellectus, in the 
Délie there are of course two human loci (if indeed ‘human’ is an accurate 
description of the cosmic and divinised lady-light). Moreover, the human 
gaze of the je is much less empowered than that of the lady. Like the sun,
25
 
                                                 
23
 Les Trois Livres des meteores (Paris: J. Richier, 1585), ff. 19v-20r. 
24
 Vasoli, ‘Thèmes solaires’, p. 114-6. 
25
 ‘Opposites and Identities’.  
 13 
the je is subjected to darkness by the lady.
26
 In addition, his perception or 
understanding is frequently violated precisely by her more powerful gaze. 
The lady undermines his gaze: ‘Les yeulx, desquelz la clarté tant me nuyt, / 
Qu’elle esblouyt ma veue entierement’ (D386); ‘Par ton regard … / Tu 
m’esblouis … la veue (D115). She obscures not only his gaze but also his 
cognition in the form of pensée, sens, and congnoissance:
27
 
 
Ce bas Soleil, qui au plus hault fait honte, 
Nous a daingné de sa rare lumiere, 
Quand sa blancheur, qui l’yvoire surmonte, 
A esclercy le brouillas de Fourviere: 
Et s’arrestant l’une, et l’aultre riviere, 
Si grand’ clarté s’est icy demonstrée, 
Que quand mes yeulx l’ont soubdain rencontrée, 
Ilz m’ont perdu au bien, qui seul me nuict. 
   Car son cler iour serenant la Contrée,  
En ma pensée a mys l’obscure nuit (D128) 
                                                 
26
 Other contemporary poets also imply that the je and the sun are similarly challenged by their encounter 
with the lady, but often suggest that the je survives his encounter with the lady where the sun failed to do 
so: see, for example, sonnet IX of Jacques Peletier Du Mans’s Amour des Amours, ed. by Jean-Charles 
Monferran (Paris: Société des Textes Français Modernes, 1996), pp. 29-30; sonnet XI of the Premier Livre 
des Sonnets pour Hélène, in Ronsard’s Amours, ed. by Françoise Joukovsky (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), 
p. 286. 
27
 See also D7, D51, D92, D269, D354 
 14 
 
Au recevoir l’aigu de tes esclairs  
Tu m’offuscas et sens, et congnoissance (D80) 
 
Thus, while one ‘human’ light or gaze exerts an effect upon nature, another 
site of human perception Ŕ the je Ŕ has his light or gaze undermined by the 
same gaze which affects the natural world.
28
 
 
 
iii) Difference And The Human Subject In The Délie  
 
Furthermore, the je also suffers a sort of ‘confusion’ or ‘mixing’ or 
‘division’. Images of melting and burning are familiar from other Petrarchist 
poetry but Scève is often particularly insistent upon developing these images 
of self-disintegration. For example, in D373, his eye dissolves and melts into 
tears, which become a river which freezes him and in so doing Ŕ somewhat 
                                                 
28
 Other implications of this are discussed in my ‘The Cosmic, the Human, and the Divine: The Role of 
Poetic Images in Guillaume de Saluste Du Bartas’s Sepmaine and Maurice Scève’s Délie’ (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 2005), Part II, and my book under preparation, Cosmos and 
Image in the French Renaissance. 
 15 
paradoxically Ŕ ‘me confond’, that is to say, ‘mixes’ and metamorphoses 
him.
29
 
 
A son aspect mon œil reveremment 
S’incline bas, tant le Cœur la revere, 
Et l’ayme, et craint trop perseveramment 
En sa rigueur benignement severe. 
   Car en l’ardeur si fort il persevere, 
Qu’il se dissoult, et tout en pleurs se fond, 
Pleurs restagnantz en un grand lac profound, 
Dont descent puis ce ruisseau argentin, 
Qui me congele, et ainsi me confond 
Tout transformé en sel Agringentin (D373) 
 
His eye also ‘dissolves’ in D200, and, in D13, his body is reduced to cinders 
which the wind threatens to scatter. In several dizains, the lady-sun ‘melts’ 
the je:  
 
Comme gelée au monter du Soleil, 
Mon ame sens, qui toute se distille 
Au rencontrer le rayant de son œil (D290) 
 
Je me deffis à si belle rencontre, 
Comme rouse au lever du Soleil (D223) 
                                                 
29
 Gérard Defaux explains that this verb comes from the Latin confundo. He provides the following 
possible meanings for it: mêler, brouiller, render méconnaissable, métamorphoser (vol. II, p. 407). 
 16 
 
Comme neige au Soleil, je me fondz (D118) 
 
 Thus, in the Délie, the human subject is subjected by the lady-sun to a 
sort of fragmentation or division of the self, and a sort of mixing of himself. 
This recalls some of the terms used to describe the effects of the intellectus-
sun upon nature in Bovelles’s Ars. Opposition brings about a divisio in 
nature. In addition, although paradoxically nature is presented in chapter 7 as 
mixed unless illuminated by the intellectus, elsewhere we are told that nature 
can remain ‘unmixed’ only because it is involved in identity rather than 
opposition (which, as we have seen, is produced by the intellectus).
30
 In 
other words, the opposition introduced by the intellectus-light brings with it 
both mixing and division. Thus in both the Délie and the Ars, a human light 
(the lady or the intellectus) inflict not only opposition but also, by the same 
token, mixing and division. However, in the Ars Oppositorum, terms like 
‘mixing’ and ‘division’ apply to what occurs in some sense to nature: they 
are associated with the discussions of cosmic things being in their own place 
or an unnatural place. By contrast, in the Délie, although the sun is subjected 
to complex relations of difference, terms suggesting division and mixing 
refer to the effects of a perception or gaze not so much upon nature as upon 
                                                 
30
 Pp. 66, 76. See n. 13.  
 17 
the poetic subject. Furthermore, division and mixing describe the state of the 
poetic subject within himself rather than in his relations to other terms.  
 
iv) Difference in the Ars Oppositorum: Violence, the Trinity, and the 
Human Subject 
The ‘division’ and ‘mixing’ of the je may have its positive aspects (for 
example, ‘si belle rencontre’, D223 quoted above), but it is often presented 
in quite anguished terms. Like the sun, the je has his light darkened, and is 
subjected to difference. Furthermore, while the lady’s infliction of difference 
may make the sun ‘jealous’, she has a particularly negative impact upon the 
human subject, who melts and is burnt and so on.  By contrast, in the Ars 
Oppositorum the human subject has a more privileged experience of 
difference. The human soul does experience a sort of separation from itself 
but this is expressed in very positive terms. Bovelles writes that the 
substance of the human soul Ŕ in common with divine and angelic 
substances alone Ŕ can experience true wisdom or sapientia.31 This sapientia 
involves separation (discretio) of the human soul from itself but this is 
thought of as multiplication or development (propagatio), which contrasts 
with Scève’s trickling or blowing away. This process in the Ars is 
                                                 
31
 pp. 46-8. See also De Sapiente and ‘L’Idéal du sage’. 
 18 
undeniably positive: not only is it something shared with the divine but it 
also involves gaining knowledge of the self; by contrast, as we have seen, 
the je in the Délie laments the undermining of his gaze or understanding, in 
other words, of his ability to know. Furthermore, although the human 
intellectus is in some sense divided, Bovelles states that it is the only 
sublunary ‘thing’ which is indivisible and unitary: ‘it is evident … that under 
the heavens only the human intellectus is indivisible, truly one and 
immortal.’32 The intellectus as described by Bovelles thus has a radically 
different experience of selfhood and knowledge from that of the human 
subject in the Délie. 
Fernand Hallyn, in his discussion of  Bovelles’s De Sapiente (On the 
Wise Man) Ŕ which was published with the Ars in 1511 and which further 
explores Bovelles’s notion of human sapientia Ŕ, suggests that the 
multiplication of Bovelles’s human subject points to a gap inherent in 
representation and resemblance, that is, to the gap of difference, which, 
according to Hallyn, the metaphysics, the aesthetics, and the art of 
Bovelles’s period were all striving to suppress.33 Hallyn’s analysis makes 
                                                 
32
 ‘Manifestum est … sub celis solus humanus intellectus esse impartibilis vere unus atque immortalis’ 
(p. 82). 
33
 ‘Le Microcosme ou l’incomplétude de la représentation’, in Romanica Gandensia XVII (1980), pp. 183-
92. 
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use of Freud, and is informed by modern theories of subjectivity. Indeed, for 
the modern reader familiar with psychoanalysis, it may be easier to accept 
Hallyn’s notion of representation than Bovelles’s alignment of self-
knowledge with self-unity: in Lacan’s famous mirror-stage, it is by 
perceiving oneself that one becomes subject to fragmentation and loses 
one’s infant wholeness. However, Bovelles’s own writing does not point to 
this psychoanalytic conception of the human subject: if this conception is 
indeed suppressed, then the suppression seems very effective. Hallyn 
observes that Bovelles’s multiplication of the human subject as ‘homo-
homo-homo’ constitutes a ‘chain’ which could be infinitely extended, like 
any chain of signifiers; its triple nature is, Hallyn suggests, arbitrary. 
However, as far as Bovelles is concerned, the human soul takes the form of a 
circle rather than a chain (p. 185); moreover, the tripling of the ‘homo’ is far 
from arbitrary, since it bestows upon man the Trinitarian number and 
therefore supports Bovelles’s suggestion that difference within the human 
intellectus resembles that within the divine. 
For Bovelles, then, the human subject Ŕ or rather the human soul Ŕ 
can achieve a privileged sort of self-difference, a ‘separation’ from the self 
which is shared only with the divine, and which sounds rather different from 
the divisio imposed upon nature by the intellectus and opposition. Indeed, 
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the divisio of nature is, as we have seen, sometimes painted in implicitly 
negative terms as a violence or force inflicted upon things. However, these 
negative terms are not distributed evenly throughout the Ars, and ultimately 
even the opposition within nature Ŕ while it cannot constitute the privileged 
sapientia of the human subject Ŕ does not seem to be conceived as negative. 
Indeed it is often described using the language of the Trinity. Thus in the 
opening chapter, Bovelles explains that the two extremes of an opposition Ŕ 
the monad and the dyad Ŕ ‘engender’ a third term, the triad; this 
‘engendering’ of a third term clearly recalls the production of the Holy Spirit 
by the Father and the Son. This sort of language returns repeatedly. For 
example, in the medium point there is a trace of the creativity of the divine 
Trinity (p.40), and in the three circles which represent the extremes and the 
middle term, one can perceive the mystery of the Trinity (p. 51). Although 
chapters 4, 6 and 7 in particular emphasise the violence of opposition, the 
final chapters return to emphasising the circles, the triad, and the middle 
term, which can be described using Trinitarian language.  
Thus, while the dyad of opposites might imply violence, this violence 
is apparently redeemed by the triad which is much more positively 
conceived. As a result, while difference occasionally appears violent and 
negative, in the case of the human soul it resembles Trinitarian difference, 
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and even in other cases it implicitly bears some resemblance to it. If all 
things cannot be quite so definitively created ‘in the image of God’ (Genesis 
26-7) as man was, they nonetheless seem to bear some trace of his image.
34
   
 
*** 
 
Thus the argument that Bovelles suppresses negative conceptions of 
difference is difficult to ground in Bovelles’s own writing. However, another 
early sixteenth-century text Ŕ the Délie Ŕ shares some of Bovelles’s 
apprehensions of difference and yet ultimately construes them with more 
negative implications. Like the Ars Oppositorum, the Délie plays with non-
binary models of difference; however, ultimately these non-binary models 
imply a less positive experience of difference, particularly for the human 
subject. Both the Ars and the Délie suggest that a powerful light or gaze 
might function to create differences. However, in Bovelles’s Ars both the 
divine and the human can have a privileged relation to difference and to 
knowledge. By contrast, this sapientia seems to be an impossibility for the je 
in the Délie: he perceives the power of a cognitive and creative ‘light’ in the 
                                                 
34
 This is a particular inflection of the notion that the cosmos and individual cosmic phenomena constitute 
images of God, an idea which justified the project of natural theology, that is the attempt to know God by 
studying the natural world.  
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figure of the lady, yet he suffers from this gaze rather than being similarly 
empowered. Scève may lack Bovelles’s confidence in the positive nature of 
difference because of love lyric’s depiction of the beloved with the traits of 
the divine. Indeed, in his De Sapiente Bovelles makes it clear that the 
movement of human cognition cannot be dissociated from the downward 
movement of the divine, which is a gift from God to man.
35
 The ie in the 
Délie relates not to God but rather to a lady who, in accordance with love 
lyric’s divinisation of the beloved, has usurped God’s place and yet is 
cruel:
36
 whereas the human subject in the Ars has a positive experience of 
difference because of his relationship with the angelic and the divine, the 
divinity of the Délie inflicts difference rather than redeeming it.
37
  
                                                 
35
 ‘Le mouvement anagogique de la raison ne saurait cependant être disjoint du mouvement condescendant 
de la lumière divine’ (‘L’Idéal du sage’, p. 108).  
36
 In particular, whereas in the Délie the lady is the desired sun, in the De Sapiente God is the sun ‘vers 
lequel tend par nécessité tout désir ou savoir’ (Vasoli, ‘Thèmes solaires’, p. 118).  
37
 My doctoral thesis discusses, from a different angle, the relationship between Scève’s depiction of the 
lady in the Délie and contemporary depictions of God; it also discusses the link between this and the 
suffering of the je. See ‘The Cosmic, the Human, and the Divine’, Part II.  
